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AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL DEBATE? 
THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL OF SECURITY STUDIES  
AND SOME REALIST RESPONSES TO WALTZ’S NEOREALISM 
 
MARINA  ELENA  TĂTĂRÂM 
 
 
Kenneth N. Waltz‟s masterpiece, Theory of International Relations, was 
published in 1979. Only twelve years later, but importantly after the crucial 
events of 1989, Barry Buzan published his own version of a theoretical 
framework for studies in International Relations, in a sample of the vivid 
realist-neorealist debate
1
. His subtitle, referring to the challenges of the post-
cold war era, makes one want to inquire whether this dispute – an intra-
paradigm debate, considering the history of the discipline – is still a matter of 
theoretical substance, or whether it merely pertains to the effects of shifting 
one‟s methods of study. 
 
 
Preliminary Considerations 
 
To proceed to a comparison of the realist and neorealist approaches, one 
must first establish the frame of reference: that is, on the one hand, the main 
hypotheses of realism in general, and, on the other hand, Waltz‟s theory in a 
nutshell – his major assumptions; the recognized scope of his theory; the 
structures and the balance of power. 
 For the realist tradition
2
, there are the three assumptions that date back 
to Thucydides‟s History of the Peloponnesian War, whether the monograph is 
                                                          
1 BARRY BUZAN is a declared realist, as the title of his work proclaims, discussing 
People, States and Fear, in resonance with the title of an earlier work by Waltz: KENNETH N. 
WALTZ, Man, State and War. A Theoretical Analysis, Columbia University Press, New York, 1959. 
2 According to Hans J. Morgenthau, there are six principles of political realism: politics is 
governed by objective laws with roots in human nature; statesmen think and act rationally, 
according to interest defined as power; this interest dictates and moves international life, although 
it is itself part of a political and cultural context within which it was formulated; universal moral 
principles cannot be applied as such, in their abstract formulation, but must be filtered through 
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cited rightfully or not within the realist paradigm. These are statism, survival, 
and self-help
3
. Several assumptions are contained within statism: the fact that 
states are the pre-eminent actors, and the only worthy units for analysis; the 
claim that states are rational and unitary actors; and the belief than any such 
unit is an independent political community with juridical authority over its 
territory. This position has constantly remained under attack as state power is 
steadfastly undermined from above and from below, in what have been 
described as the mutually enhancing flows of globalization and regionalization. 
The theoretical position of realism
4
, constantly centered on self-interested 
states, which compete constantly for power or security, has also opened the way 
to various criticisms, as Machiavellianism in the actions states may take in the 
name of necessity has been attacked on many occasions. With states as the 
preferred units of analysis, realists maintain that one‟s economic and especially 
military power alone count as instruments for international behavior. This 
accounts for the self-help environment, but has been considered rather a poor 
excuse for perpetuating the status-quo; in the famous words of Alexander 
Wendt, „anarchy is what states make of it”5. The realists‟ post-cold war 
prediction was the resurgence of overt great power competition in a multipolar, 
dangerous world. So far however, they agree that unipolarity remains the case, 
and the only novelty appears to be the additional emphasis on non-conventional 
threats to security, particularly after September 11
th
, 2001
6
. 
Neorealism purports to move beyond classical realism, including a 
remarkable effort to produce empirically testable statements and stricter 
definitions of key terms such as system, power, national interest, equilibrium, 
and structure, intertwined with a comparative analysis of competing paradigms 
                                                                                                                                              
the concrete circumstances of time and place; there should be no confusion of a nation‟s prevalent 
moral principles with some abstract natural right, all our judgments must be based on 
computations of interest, since interests are easier to quantify; lastly, one must observe the 
proclaimed autonomy of the political sphere. See HANS J. MORGENTHAU, „Chapter 1: Theory 
and Practice of International Politics”, in: Idem, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power 
and Peace, Alfred Knopf, New York, 1955 [1948], pp. 3-13. 
3 Synthetically, these are explained in TIMOTHY DUNNE, „Realism”, in: John Baylis 
and Steve Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International 
Relations, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, pp. 118-119. 
4 As interpreted, for instance, by STEPHEN M. WALT, „International Relations: One 
World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy 110, Spring 1998, p. 38. 
5 ALEXANDER WENDT, „Collective Identity Formation and the International State”, 
American Political Science Review, 88: 2, June 1994, p. 338. 
6 The theory of hegemonic stability of Charles P. Kindleberger, for instance, acts in 
validation of such an observation, as well as in justification of post-cold war American foreign 
policy. See STEFANO GUZZINI, Realism şi relaţii internaţionale: Povestea fără sfârşit a unei 
morţi anunţate. realismul în relaţiile internaţionale şi în economia politică internaţională, 
Institutul European, Iaşi, 2000, pp. 289-303. 
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in the theory of international relations. This is particularly true of Waltz‟s 
work
7
, who sets out to define and clarify the concept of structure. He does so by 
specifying for each structure its ordering principle, the functions of its units, 
and the distribution of capabilities among these. Central to Waltz‟s theory is the 
celebrated idea that of the two possible ordering principles, hierarchy or 
anarchy, the international system is based on the consequences of the latter. 
More exactly, two types of structural order exist in his view. There is the 
hierarchical relationship – based on the degree of authority or on the function 
performed by the elements of a structure, which is seen at its best in domestic 
politics. And there is, alternately, the anarchical state in which our international 
system perpetuates itself, for lack of a comparably authoritative super-governmental 
institutions, or of any power-generating center. As Waltz himself confirms, 
 
Nationally, the force of a government is exercised in the name of right and justice. 
Internationally, the force of a state is employed for the sake of its own protection and 
advantage. [...] National politics is the realm of authority, of administration, and of law. 
International politics is the realm of power, of struggle, and of accommodation. The 
international realm is preeminently a political one. The national realm is variously 
described as being hierarchic, vertical, centralized, heterogeneous, directed, and 
contrived; the international realm, as being anarchic, horizontal, decentralized, 
homogeneous, undirected, and mutually adaptive.8 
 
Where the controlling principle is (domestic) hierarchy, the functions of 
the units are widely differentiated, as in any rational administration. By 
contrast, where the anarchic principle reigns, since states and other units 
become the formal equals of each other, their functions are also inevitably 
similar. However, despite their comparable functions (goals), which continue to 
range, in the realist tradition, from self-preservation up to world domination, 
the distribution of capabilities among the units varies largely. The capabilities 
Waltz lists are quite varied themselves: some are military, but others are 
economic, such as levels of industrialization and productivity, GNP, national 
income, income on a per capita basis, etc., as shown in the appendix of his book. 
 
 
Various Critiques 
 
Andrew Linklater
9
 lists some main differences between realism and 
neorealism. Above all, there is Waltz‟s critique of reductionist theories which 
presume to explain the system by understanding its sovereign parts. So he 
                                                          
7 KENNETH N. WALTZ, Theory of International Relations, McGraw-Hill, Inc., New 
York, 1979. 
8 Ibidem, p. 113. 
9 ANDREW LINKLATER, „Neo-Realism in Theory and Practice,” in: Ken Booth and 
Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory Today, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1995,         
pp. 242-245. 
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proposes a more serious analysis, in his opinion inadequately developed by the 
classical realists: the systemic constraints of international-level anarchy which 
explain why very diverse states function identically in their foreign policy 
behavior. Yet the relationship between the units and the system remains quite 
unclear even under Waltz‟s theoretical endeavor. Distinguishing the theory of 
international relations from sheer foreign policy, Waltz produces an essentially 
epistemological work, purporting to finally abstract international relations from 
economics, domestic politics, and culture. While ignoring many factors that 
were central to realism, Waltz assumes that the regularities and repetitions in 
international politics are clues to the operation of deep structural constraints in 
a system with a precisely defined structure. He differentiates between 
international and domestic politics according to three criteria: the ordering 
principle of the system (anarchy and an inherent security dilemma forcing 
states into self-help strategies, while domestically the ordering principle is 
hierarchy), the character of the units (functionally alike), and the distribution of 
their capabilities (unequal). Waltz, surpassing the classical realists, makes a 
slight concession to modernity: economic interdependence exists, but it is low 
compared with the level of economic and social integration found within states. 
Another dubious remark is his reference to the law of liberal democracies not 
fighting each other, which challenges his entire theoretical construct:  
 
International stability may come to depend less on the number of great powers, or 
on the nature of their destructive capabilities, than on the principles of international 
relations they espouse and the moral constraints which they recognize.10  
 
While he identifies trends, and develops an entire theory of the bipolar 
system, US hegemonic power, nuclear deterrence, and the balance of power, 
accounting for reconfigurations within the international system as transitory, 
and moreover immaterial to its ordering principle, Waltz‟s quest for methodological 
rigor leads to a poor prediction of the timing of future events. This has always 
been the focal point of criticism addressed to realism and neorealism alike, the 
more so, as it was said, since 1989 and the end of the Cold War
11
. 
Hence the main difference from realism is that neorealism absolutely 
discourages the analysis of unit-driven change. In Linklater‟s words, we either 
face Waltz‟s orientation towards manipulation and control, or Morgenthau‟s 
practical realism with an orientation towards diplomatic understanding and 
                                                          
10 Ibidem, p. 248. 
11 See for example the attack upon „grand theories” performed by JEAN BETHKE 
ELSHTAIN, „International Politics and Political Theory”, in: Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds.), 
op. cit., pp. 272-273. 
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consensus
12
. But even structural theories (neo-Kantian and others) have to 
criticize neorealist assumptions
13
: Francis Fukuyama and Michael Doyle argue 
that the trends for democratization testify for deep currents of global change, 
consensus prevailing over force; neoliberal institutionalists note that while 
territorial pursuits are no longer necessary for economic development and co-
operation becomes a rational strategy, modern warfare is now too costly to be 
an acceptable conflict termination tool, at least in the industrialized world; John 
Mueller parallels its decline to that of the 19
th
 century disgrace of duels; James 
Lee Ray puts it on the same level with slavery, which was also eventually 
banned as a consequence of moral developments
14
. On average, what is now 
taking place is a reversal of the preferences, ranking low politics higher than 
matters of security and military force that belonged once to the high politics.  
Thus the critics of neorealism rally against the latter‟s four major 
assumptions: that strategic factors shape power relations and any pacification is 
temporary; that cultural forces, beliefs and traditions are denied any central role 
in determining recurrent patterns in international relations; that the system 
should be studied in isolation from its units; and that the emphasis of the theory 
of international relations should still be on power and security.  
 
They argue that neorealism is too quick to endorse prevailing realities, and its 
legitimation of the status quo should come to an end.15  
 
Another criticism stems from highlighting the internal contradictions of 
the theory. Indeed, the latter cannot assess whether units or system prevail in 
the framing of future events, so decides to study the system in isolation and 
unjustly badmouths reductionist theories. John Ruggie observes that neorealism 
did not explain the shift from the medieval international society to the modern 
system of states, an example of changes in the ordering principle by a 
metamorphosis of the principle of separability
16
. An entire new school of 
                                                          
12 ANDREW LINKLATER, „Neo-Realism in Theory and Practice,” in: Ken Booth and 
Steve Smith, op. cit., pp. 242-245. 
13 TIMOTHY DUNNE, „Realism”, in: John Baylis and Steve Smith, op. cit., pp. 120. 
14 Ibidem. 
15 ANDREW LINKLATER, „Neo-Realism in Theory and Practice,” in: Ken Booth and 
Steve Smith, op. cit., p. 251. 
16 JOHN GERARD RUGGIE, „What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-
Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge”, in: International Organization, 52:4, 
Summer 1998, pp. 855-85. Ruggie portrays his preferred manner to counter such conventional 
approaches, with too many gratuitous assumptions (perhaps even falsifiable with empirical 
findings). He suggests problematizing the interests and identities of all relevant actors involved; 
reframing and incorporating the bases of social action, which, as the social order and the principle 
of separability, are intersubjective; finally, to reconsider time and space as variables which help 
establish international structure as contingent practice rather that primary assumption, 
incontrovertibly interconnected with social action throughout its transformation. 
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international relations developed based on the thesis that, contrary to the realist 
claim, sovereignty is socially constructed. The proponents of the constructivist 
paradigm thus notice that the meaning and importance of sovereignty change 
over time, state egotism being thus an acquired feature rather than a given
17
. 
Despite such criticism, an important feature of neorealism has been its 
decisive rejection of reductionism. In fact, while proceeding to show why a new 
theory was needed, and by giving away glimpses of his own perspective, Waltz 
has criticized quite a few thinkers of the realist school. His inquiry would 
require an extensive examination of the texts under review for counter-
arguments, or at least – as proposed in the following section – a panoramic 
view of the quoted theorists, touching on a few key elements, which were 
identified by Waltz himself. 
 
 
The Intra-Paradigm Debate 
 
The debate for a „theory of international relations” monopolizes a large 
portion of the argument between realists and neorealists, and indeed of the 
inter-paradigm debate of the entire discipline. Raymond Aron complained 
about the lack of rigor in the study of international relations, and decided that 
the late start of the discipline could not justify the frantic, chaotic, 
indiscriminate accumulation of writings on the subject. When he distinguished 
between theory as contemplative knowledge and theory as „systhème 
hypothetico-deductif”18, Raymond Aron came incredibly close to Waltz‟s own 
repeated concerns about having to chose between a more complicated theory 
(one that, for instance, would have a third alternative to hierarchy and anarchy, 
and would describe reality better), or one that would simply approximate world 
politics, but would be capable of better predictions, as a more manageable 
framework
19. Whatever its other faults, Waltz‟s work constitutes a formidable 
epistemological effort to establish the scope and even existence as a discipline 
of international relations:  
 
The problem seen in the light of the theory is not to say how to manage the world, 
including its great powers, but to say how the possibility that great powers will 
constructively manage international affairs varies as systems change20. 
 
                                                          
17 Quoting Alexander Wendt and Richard K. Ashley, in: TIMOTHY DUNNE, „Realism”, 
in John Baylis and Steve Smith, op. cit., p. 120. 
18 RAYMOND ARON, „Qu‟est-ce qu‟une théorie des relations internationales”, Études 
Politiques, NRF Gallimard, Paris, 1972, pp. 357-381. 
19 KENNETH N. WALTZ, op. cit., 1979, p. 116. 
20 Ibidem, p. 210. 
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Nonetheless, even this claim has been challenged in the realist school by 
James N. Rosenau
21
 and Quincy Wright
22
. If in 1955 Quincy Wright described 
the field of international relations as an emerging discipline, forged by history 
and logic alike, he also developed his own definition of a good [deductive] 
theory of international relations:  
 
[It] means a comprehensive, coherent and self-correcting body of knowledge 
contributing to the understanding, the prediction, the evaluation and the control of the 
relations among states and of the conditions of the world.23  
 
Waltz does produce a parsimonious theory, but despite his attempt to 
address virtually all the points above, his is a prediction of possible flows, 
rather than one that tempts time prognoses, and thus one of a rather poor utility. 
In any case, Quincy Wright gives a few hints that may be useful in the 
treatment of international relations and in its development as a distinct 
discipline. He lists four basic intellectual perspectives, corresponding to 
history, art, science and philosophy, and divides all social reality into the 
actual, the possible, the probable, and the desirable. The actual refers to 
description, the possible to speculation, the probable to prediction, and the 
desirable to ethical reflection and normative valuation
24
. One must note that due 
to the habitual interdisciplinarity of the theory of international relations, both 
Waltz and the realists manage to include all four categories in what is 
supposedly a positivist approach. 
Even more sternly, James N. Rosenau distinguishes sharply between 
empirical and normative (ethical) theories and he insists that they remain 
separate. Instead, his own must be an empirical and inductive theory, one that is 
general, and – most importantly – testable25.  
Thus Waltz fulfills a little of each one‟s requirements. His Theory of 
International Relations is a deductive model that seeks empirical virtues, but 
like any other in the realist tradition, ends up with normative hues: it would be 
better if we all could think in terms of interest, security, and anarchy, and then 
                                                          
21 Please refer to JAMES N. ROSENAU, The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy, rev. ed., 
Frances Pinter, London, 1980, pp. 19-31. 
22 See QUINCY WRIGHT, „Development of a General Theory of International 
Relations”, in: Horace V. Harrison (ed.), The Role of Theory in International Relations, Van 
Nostrand, Princeton, NJ, 1964, pp. 20-23.  
23 Apud JAMES E. DOUGHERTY and ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, Jr., Contending 
Theories of International Relations. A Comparative Survey, Longman, New York, 1996, p. 23. 
Even so, the span of these virtues remains highly questionable, given the professed lack of 
explanatory power of neorealism (see below). 
24 Ibidem, p. 45. 
25 Ibidem, p. 24. 
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predictions will be more accurate
26
. Moreover, the entire discussion of the 
virtues of bipolar over multipolar systems cannot be tested by experience, 
hence it is based on the theorist‟s assumptions of the amount of insecurity in 
the international system, of the number of actors to whom states must allocate 
their attention, and of the non-testable, but atrociously precedented destructive 
power of nuclear weapons. 
When discussing power and international behavior, one may challenge 
the quality of prediction as influenced by the mere definition of the term, whose 
many meanings and attributes are a concern for Stanley Hoffmann
27
 and Robert 
Gilpin
28
, among many others. Waltz himself stops after having proclaimed that 
an actor is powerful insofar as he has the ability to influence another actor to 
do, or not to do, something desired by that actor.  
Nonetheless, many theories have lived well without too big an ado over 
the definition of this crucial concept. For instance, the celebrated work
29
 of 
Edward Hallett Carr, originally published in 1939 and having passed 
unattacked by Waltz, has been re-examined by the neoliberal institutionalists 
and found of great use, despite the completely different circumstances of the 
world politics in the age of EU (hopefully) enlargement. Hoffmann, on the 
other hand, has stood under steep criticism by Waltz, under the famous 
accusation of having built a reductionist framework. Hoffmann is said to have 
confused changes of systems with changes within systems, and Waltz‟s verdict 
is clear:  
 
„System‟ then does not explain anything; rather the exhaustive description of 
everything describes the system, and a new system is said to emerge every time there is 
reason to change the description in any important respect.30  
 
One must reckon that Waltz falls perhaps in the other extreme, denying 
that systems change and producing a most conservative, self-contained theory, 
where any development is simply a feeble vibration of the [bipolar] 
arrangement. His critique is more convincing when he shows how Hoffmann 
purportedly crammed everything into his notion of structure: attributes and 
behavior of units, patterns of power, ambitions and means of rulers, the extent 
of national integration, the properties of the political institutions - all these push 
                                                          
26 About the same argument as the one circulated by HANS J. MORGENTHAU, „Chapter 
1: Theory and Practice of International Politics”, in: Idem, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle 
for Power and Peace, Alfred Knopf, New York, 1955 [1948], pp. 3-13. 
27 See STANLEY HOFFMANN, „An American Social Science: International Relations”, 
Daedalus CVI, Summer, pp. 41-60. 
28 See ROBERT GILPIN, „The Richness of the Realist Tradition”, in: Robert O. Keohane 
(ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics, Columbia University Press, New York, pp. 301-21. 
29 EDWARD HALLETT CARR, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919-1939: An Introduction 
to the Study of International Relations, Harper & Row (Torchbooks), New York, 1964.  
30 KENNETH N. WALTZ, op. cit., 1979, p. 45. 
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him into the area of historical sociology and reductionism, while confusing the 
individual, the state, and the international level of analysis expounded since 
Morgenthau. 
Not even Raymond Aron is left untouched when he writes that „the principal 
actors have predetermined the system more than they have been predetermined 
by it”31, he analyses the system by constantly moving inside and out of the 
systemic framework, by using an inside-out analysis. Again, one must defend 
the classical realists who seek to include all intervening factors in order to predict 
more, and more accurately, however complicated the framework may become. 
In the realist-neorealist debate, one must also keep in mind that both 
approaches uphold the status quo (as „surviving vestiges” of the Cold War era), 
and that one must look into how the theorists propose to apply their predictions. 
Waltz‟s inferences about neocolonialism32, for instance, versus the cases of 
Morton A. Kaplan
33
 and Henry A. Kissinger
34
 are quite significant, as the two 
theorists he criticizes produce practical advice and evaluations of the previous 
systems. Kaplan for instance lists six rules that define the balance of power 
system
35
, a system, that is, which he strongly disapproves for its internal 
inconsistencies. Nonetheless, he is ruled out as well for claiming that the 
variables of a system represent its content. More importantly involved in 
foreign policy making, Henry A. Kissinger is also under scrutiny. Summing up 
Kissinger‟s conclusions, Waltz writes: 
 
[...] Kissinger had earlier agreed with Morgenthau in believing that the 
preservation of peace and the maintenance of international stability depend on the 
attitudes and internal characteristics of states. Kissinger defined an international order as 
„legitimate” if it is accepted by all of the major powers and as „revolutionary” if one or 
more of them rejects it. In contrast to a legitimate order, a revolutionary order is one in 
which one or more of the major states refuses to deal with other states according to the 
conventional rules of the game. The quality of the order depends on the dispositions of 
the states that constitute it. A legitimate international order tends toward stability and 
peace; a revolutionary international order, toward instability and war. Revolutionary 
states make international systems revolutionary; a revolutionary system is one that 
contains one or more revolutionary states.36 
 
                                                          
31 Apud IBIDEM, p. 47. 
32 Ibidem, pp. 147-148. 
33 See MORTON A. KAPLAN, System and Process in International Politics, Wiley, New 
York, 1964. 
34 See HENRY A. KISSINGER, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Harper, New 
York, 1957. 
35 Apud KENNETH N. WALTZ, op. cit., 1979, p. 51. Waltz then synthesizes these rules 
on the following page, as follows: „A. Act as cheaply as possible to increase capabilities; B. 
Protect yourself against others acting according to rule A;  C. Act to maintain the number of units 
essential to the system”. 
36 Ibidem, p. 63. 
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It is easy to see where Kissinger has erred with respect to Waltz‟s 
requirements. Practically, we would always face a revolutionary order, but 
Waltz‟s anarchy does not necessarily lead to anarchy and war, when such 
checks as hegemony and bipolarity or mutual nuclear deterrence are in place. It 
is in fact precisely this „bias”, seeing the world as a big Prisoner‟s Dilemma 
game, that places Waltz in the camp of defensive neorealists, with Robert 
Jervis, Stephen van Evera, Stephen Walt, and Jack Snyder
37
, as opposed to 
offensive neorealists like John Mearsheimer and Randall Schweller
38
, who see 
states on a permanent quest for more power at the expense of their rivals, with 
no constraints from composition of the international structure. 
 
 
Security Studies and their Debate with Waltz’s Neorealism 
 
Similar judgments of the basic anarchic structure of the international 
scene are held by other realists, keeping clear the distinction between the 
horrific Hobbesian state and anarchy as a decentralized form of political order. 
Thus Buzan
39
 does accept the anarchy principle and molds his own concept of 
security accordingly. While he refuses to give a synthetic definition of the 
elusive term, he recognizes the areas that affect the security of human 
collectivities as the military, the political, the economic, the societal and 
environmental sectors
40
. On top of these, he names three major conditions 
induced by the absence of central government at the international level: 
 
1. States are the principal referent object of security because they are both the 
framework of order and the highest source of governing authority [hence] the dominating 
policy concern with „national‟ security.41 
 
                                                          
37 See ROBERT A. JERVIS, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma”, World Politics, 
30: 2, 1978, pp. 167-214; STEPHEN VAN EVERA, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of 
Conflict, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1999; STEPHEN M. WALT, The Origins of Alliances, 
Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1987; JACK SNYDER, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and 
International Ambition, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1991. 
38 JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold 
War” in: Michael Brown, Owen Coté, Sean Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller (eds.), Theories of 
War and Peace, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1998; RANDALL L. SCHWELLER, “Neorealism's 
Status-Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?”, in: Benjamin Franklin (ed.), Realism: Restatements 
and Renewal, Frank Cass, London, 1996, pp. 90-120. 
39 For easier reference we shall submit Barry Buzan as the main proponent of the security 
concepts generally attributed to the Copenhagen School. For a further discussion of the 
conceptual apparatus of the Copenhagen School, we refer to BARRY BUZAN, OLE WÆVER, 
JAAP DE WILDE, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder 
and London, 1998. Here the authors discuss the five dimensions of security, the stages up to the 
securitization of an issue, and the challenge for regionalizing security, with additional details. 
40 BARRY BUZAN, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security 
Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed., Harvester Wheatsheaf, New York, 1991, p. 19. 
41 Ibidem, p. 22. 
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That is, an approach where states are the dominant actors. 
 
2. [Yet] the dynamics of national security are highly relational and interdependent 
between states. [...] The idea of international security is therefore best used to refer to the 
systemic conditions that influence the ways in which states make each other feel more or 
less secure. Individual national securities can only be fully understood when considered in 
relation both to each other and to larger patterns of relations in the system as a whole.42 
 
That is, a systemic approach. 
 
3. Given the durability of anarchy, the practical meaning of security can only be 
constructed sensibly if it can be made operational within an environment in which 
competitive relations are inescapable. [...] Among other things, this means that under 
anarchy, security can only be relative, never absolute. [...] If there is ever a structural shift 
out of anarchy [into harmony or hegemony], then the entire framework of the security 
problematique would have to be redefined.43 
 
That is, a system where only relative gains count for power computations and 
consequently for decision-making. 
Waltz‟s references to security were limited to the section on collective 
security systems, where he is led to draw uncomfortable comparisons between 
the UN and League of Nations and the old balance of power system, in a total 
contempt for the multi- (five-) polar system. His claim that the most important 
means of control in security matters are  
 
[…] to interdict the use of force by the threat of force, to oppose force with force, 
to influence the policies of the state by the threat or use of force […]44,  
 
offers a common gist with the realists – in that interdependence is viewed with 
suspicion – and an example of how anarchy places the burden of the 
management of international affairs on states within a bipolar system.  
An important point of difference from realists and a contestation with 
Buzan‟s theory occurs when Waltz affirms, in a previous chapter, that: 
 
In anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states safely 
seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power. Because power is a means and not 
an end, states prefer to join the weaker of two coalitions. They cannot let power, a 
possibly useful means, become the end they pursue. The goal that system encourages 
them to seek is security. Increased power may not serve that end. [...] If states wished to 
maximize power, they would join the stronger side, and we would see not balances 
forming but a world hegemony forged. This does not happen because balancing, not 
bandwagoning, is the behavior induced by the system. The first concern of states is not to 
maximize power but to maintain their positions in the system.45 
 
                                                          
42 Ibidem, pp. 22-23. 
43 Ibidem, p. 23. 
44 KENNETH N. WALTZ, op. cit., 1979, p. 209. 
45 Ibidem, p. 126. 
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A difference occurs between the two theorists on the importance of state 
power as a means or an end to achieve security. While, as we have seen, Waltz 
can see even the reverse of this power seeking for fear of preventive wars, 
Buzan is not as categorical and maintains the power variable as an important 
factor in his predictions. The table offered by Buzan
46
, correlating socio-
political cohesion and state power to predict their vulnerability to threats of 
national security, revives the revisited geopolitical formulae for computing 
national power as a function of outer and inner perceptions of leadership, 
military and economic outputs. Nonetheless, this is a perfect example of a 
calculus that Waltz would certainly not perform within his structural realism, 
but would classify as a dubious mixture of criteria pertaining to reductionist 
theories. 
If Barry Buzan were to give a definition of security, it would include a 
discussion of the „pursuit of freedom from threat”, which appears to have been 
translated as the right (of the Bush administration) to wage pre-emptive war. 
Indeed, the discussion here meets another debate, on the substance of terms like 
„national interest” and „national security”. Like Waltz, Buzan agrees to place 
security at the center of the units‟ preoccupations; nevertheless, his explanation 
is slightly different, as security is about „the ability of states and societies to 
maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity”47. So, as in 
Arnold Wolfers‟s definition, security includes the cardinal matter of values, 
something Waltz did not mention in this rather Schmittian concept of the 
political. 
In short, Wolfers suggests that most people consider security, together 
with power and wealth (two other concepts on which one may dwell), values of 
great importance in international affairs. He further notes the identification of 
these values – taken together – with the notion of national interest: 
 
Security in an objective sense measures the absence of threats to acquired values, 
in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked.48  
 
The reference is made to national decision-makers, calling into mind the 
critique to the realist idea of states as rational and unitary actors. Arnold 
Wolfers himself observes that in actual practice nations never pursue uniform 
policies of security
49
. To confirm his own line of argument, Wolfers then 
mentions the findings of several other theorists. Walter Lippmann writes that a 
nation is secure as long as it doesn‟t have to sacrifice core values when it 
wishes to avoid war. Also, if this nation is attacked, it is able to maintain the 
                                                          
46 BARRY BUZAN, op. cit., p. 114. 
47 Ibidem, p. 25. 
48 ARNOLD WOLFERS, „‟National Security‟ as an Ambiguous Symbol”, Political 
Science Quarterly, 67: 4, 1952, p. 485. 
49 Ibidem, p. 486. 
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values by winning such a war. But arguing that they are trying to maintain their 
values, a nation may attempt world domination. So where is the limit? Does a 
state's security depend on whether it can deter an attack or on whether it can 
defend itself against it? Surprisingly for an author so disappointed in the 
idealist League of Nations, Hans Morgenthau admits forceful response to 
violent attack, not preventive war
50
. 
Following Machiavelli, or at least the vulgar understanding of his works, 
the protection and preservation of national core values have been at the top of 
any list of objectives, but now we realize that the means that we pursue must be 
taken into account as well. Security in relation with other countries is 
achievable by alliances, armaments or by neutrality. Which of these will prevail 
is a matter of circumstances and dissuasion from use and threat of force by the 
most effective and fashionable international regimes. 
Indeed, to try and give operational meaning to such a catch-all term, not 
to mention in the all-pervasive vagueness of social science terms, can easily 
cast anyone in the most acute version of relativism. But beyond the linguistic 
matters, one must notice that states are subject to many forces, of all the three 
celebrated levels of neorealist analysis, when they perform the task of 
interpreting national interest. Some are contemporary, others are a continuance 
of their predecessors‟ policies, and it is never decided whether one is more 
captive to such tradition in matters of trade or of foreign policy, for instance. 
The matter of human decision-making provides ample space to communitarian 
and reflectivist theses, as theorists of international relations often note: 
 
They interpret national interest as a result of their cultural training, values, and the 
data made available to them as decision makers.51 
 
With the current shift from national to international security interests, 
Wolfers‟ breakdown of national interest in security plus wealth plus power is 
quite useful. Useful are also his caution words on the zero-sum games to be 
played between economic welfare and sheer constantly modernized armament. 
The shift to economic competition might even quell the famous security 
dilemma, maybe inviting other side effects, hopefully more peaceful. 
Consider the outcome of joining an alliance. On the one hand, one can 
share the costs of security (in an „economies of scale‟ approach: costs to the 
alliance are smaller than the sum of costs to individual members), thus relieving 
national actors of some pressure on the civilian economy when the decision to 
upgrade armament is made. On the other hand, the alignment to common 
decisions and threats – that grounds behavior within the alliance – may 
                                                          
50 HANS J. MORGENTHAU, op. cit., pp. 68-71. 
51 JAMES E. DOUGHERTY and ROBERT PFALTZGRAFF, Jr., „Realism-Neorealism: 
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significantly reduce state autonomy and increase the costs of defection, 
somehow in line with liberal institutionalist literature. Such values as alliance 
membership and autonomy are thus increasingly computed – even by the 
inveterate realists – in terms of each one‟s marginal utility. 
In the meanwhile, upon a simple examination of the security agendas in 
various countries, one could detect a canopy of perceptions about what should 
be securitized, what constitutes a threat and what is in general the local security 
interest. The degree of sophistication in detecting and prioritizing technological 
and informational gaps for instance is appalling; especially from nations where 
there is ongoing debate about brain drain and lack of productive 
competitiveness. Instead, the traditional concern with potentially annoying 
neighbors is not in danger of being understated. On the contrary, some of the 
texts could even give birth to diplomatic incidents, if not read by decision-
makers with similar activities, who evaluate correctly the „menace‟ behind 
closed doors. Far still from globalization, for some decision centers regionalism 
works better as a paradigm, and the legendary quip about understanding each 
others‟ jokes is a perfect illustration of such states of fact. 
By ironical situations, bound to evolve into professional diplomatic 
relations and better care in elaborating public documents, the matter of what is 
national interest will continue, giving cause to cautions of mass manipulation 
and old claims by new political alternatives. Realism is bound to react in a 
significant adaptive way to the questions it asks of itself and asked of it since 
day one. Summarized, some of these are: 
 
[…] the interaction and behavior of human beings as decision makers, the nature 
of power, the goals of foreign policy, the techniques for measuring and managing power, 
the impact of environmental factors on political behavior, the purposes and practices that 
ought to guide moral leaders, and the impact of structures of alternative international 
systems.52 
 
Nevertheless, globalization of threats is catching up with every 
international actor. The same Copenhagen School of security studies has thus 
proposed, in addition to the defense of the traditional political and military 
sphere of „interest‟, particular attention to economic, societal and 
environmental security.  
More precisely, in contemporary security analysis studies, while military 
security issues must be concerned primarily with national defense, one must 
note the changing functions of the armed forces, increasingly involved in 
peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention domestically and most often 
abroad. The political notion of security, usually linked to state sovereignty and 
to its dominant ideology, is extending to supranational entities, disintegration 
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becoming the most horrific threat. The economic security sector is increasingly 
elusive, due to the increasing number of multinational firms, to the quasi-
unpredictable daily fluctuations of market economy and consequently to the 
distant thresholds of securitization. The societal security sector refers to the  
 
[…] large-scale collective entities that can function independent of the state, such 
as nations and religions. [...] Thus, whether migrants or rival identities are 
securitized depends upon whether the holders of the collective identity take a 
relative close mind or a relatively open-minded view of how their identity is 
constituted and maintained. The abilities to maintain and reproduce language, a 
set of behavioral customs, or a conception of ethnic purity can all be cast in terms 
of survival.53 
 
The Austrian nationalist fears sanctioned in 2001, and indeed continuing 
European cautions about the rhythm of in-taking immigration can be seen as 
instances of societal securitization. The influx of North African immigration 
into Southern Europe causes rebuttals of religious securitization in countries 
otherwise proud of valuing tolerance and institutional secularization. It is a 
matter of how quickly such values acquire what Wolfers calls, in a slightly 
different context, „new national values requiring protection themselves”54. 
Besides, following Wolfers‟s distinction, to increase wealth and power, and 
even – legislation-permitting – the might of one‟s military forces, perhaps the 
national interest of an ageing Europe should emphasize the selection of 
competent tax-paying work-force, be it even from abroad.  
Finally, environmental security refers to endangered species as well as to 
the prevention of green-house effects; in this context, the notion of sustainable 
development comes up evermore often at the micro and macro levels of human 
organization. 
One must also pay attention to the necessary distinction between 
politicization and securitization, weighing the advantages and effectiveness of 
each, issue by issue. Declaring an issue existentially threatened may mobilize 
support, along the channels of security legitimacy; but where excessive 
securitization has been known to generate security dilemmas, not scrutinizing at 
all has led to ineffectiveness of handling the issue at stake. Again, the golden 
mean must be observed, keeping in mind the importance of public debate and 
the advantages of involvement in the political practice. Or, observance of the 
golden mean is precisely what thinking in terms of a grand theory like Waltz‟s 
defensive or Mearsheimer‟s offensive neorealism prevents. In this sense, the 
theorists of the Copenhagen School of security studies are much more 
„realistic‟ about the predictive and policy-making powers of its conceptual 
framework. 
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Conclusions 
 
We have seen the main criticisms of realism and neorealism, each and 
both, disputing the difference between them as perceived by other international 
relations currents. We have also seen the parallel controversies between 
theorists in either camp.  
So, in short, in what consists the divide? What are the consequences for 
the predictive powers of realism as a trend of thought?  
As was said before, neorealism discourages the analysis of units and of 
the changes these may entail. As actors multiply, and – despite realist and 
neorealist claims – globalization steps in, this may well be the safe route to 
assume. Where only structures matter, Waltz‟s criticism of the complicatedness 
of the reductionist frameworks falls, because his own theory maintains both a 
horizontal structure as among equal actors, and a vertical one caused by the 
constant switching between domestic and foreign politics. Finally, realist 
writers have adapted the classical framework better than the neorealist one to 
the new, post-Cold War, developments, and to new areas of research. In his 
security studies, Barry Buzan has shown how –for designing a national security 
policy – neither the realist view, exaggerating the necessity for a powerful state, 
nor the liberal-utopian approach, seeking trust and order at the international 
level, are to be preferred. He persuades himself to take a third approach, 
mindful of the cross-sector linkages and of the perceptions and fears of all the 
actors involved across the decision-making levels.  
Whether or not the approach of the Copenhagen School in the end takes 
on these almost integrative, functionalist hues, it is both the product of having 
to face a changing world, and the yield of the intra- and inter-paradigm debates 
that have transformed the discipline of international relations since its very 
creation.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
